Air Cavalry Tactics in Vietnam

Two distances that appear the same in a flat tactical map may be very different when moving infantry divisions over difficult or treacherous terrain like swamps, jungles, forests and hills–such terrain hinders movement and speed enormously, and can be the determining factor in losing or winning any operation. Vietnam is composed mostly of that treacherous terrain, and its implacable hostility posed a problem for vehicles so big that a new concept was born.

The idea was to form an infantry unit that had integrated air mobility. In 1963, the 11th Air Assault was called to field test that concept–the unit had to function like any other light infantry unit, but with helicopters replacing their wheeled and tracked vehicles.

The “air vehicles” would not just supplement the unit, but rather become its backbone. For more than two years, all aspects of this theory were refined and field tested in several war games, and by June 1965 a permanent unit was organized: the 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile, or “1st Aircav.”

A U.S. Army rifle squad from the Blue Team of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry exiting from a Bell UH-1D Huey helicopter in Vietnam.It was the air cavalry reconnaissance squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division throughout the division’s service in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972.
A U.S. Army rifle squad from the Blue Team of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry exiting from a Bell UH-1D Huey helicopter in Vietnam.It was the air cavalry reconnaissance squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division throughout the division’s service in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972.

In Vietnam, the 1st Aircav set up camp in a place called An Khe, northeast of Saigon. They cleared several acres of terrain, mostly using handheld tools since construction machines were too heavy to transport, and improvised an airfield and heliport with several helipads, which they affectionately named “The Golf Course” due to its varying elevations and grass heights.

Aerial view of An Khe airfield under construction, 1965.
Aerial view of An Khe airfield under construction, 1965.

The 1st Aircav consisted of maneuver battalions, artillery battalions, the main aircav squad, a logistics squad, and even its own aviation group. Not surprisingly, it was able to act as a self-sufficient army. They even ferried their own supplies to and from the base and headquarters, and they had a CH-47 Chinook battalion that could also ferry many of the foot battalions quickly into and out of strategic zones, along with their artillery pieces and ammunition.

A CH-47 Chinook airlifts a MIKE Force Hurricane Aircat airboat from Don Phuc to the Seven Mountains in Vietnam.
A CH-47 Chinook airlifts a MIKE Force Hurricane Aircat airboat from Don Phuc to the Seven Mountains in Vietnam.

Drops into hot zones, however, were made by UH-1H Hueys. In any mission, a vital asset to every helicopter pilot was his door gunner–every chopper had at least one of them, and never went out without one. Door gunners were crucial for defending the aircraft from the sides while it was in a hovering position, its most vulnerable stance.

U.S. Army Bell UH-1D helicopters airlift members of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment from the Filhol Rubber Plantation area to a new staging area, during Operation “Wahiawa”, a search and destroy mission conducted by the 25th Infantry Division, northeast of Cu Chi, South Vietnam, 1966.
U.S. Army Bell UH-1D helicopters airlift members of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment from the Filhol Rubber Plantation area to a new staging area, during Operation “Wahiawa”, a search and destroy mission conducted by the 25th Infantry Division, northeast of Cu Chi, South Vietnam, 1966.

The 1st Aircav had some conventional artillery and rocket artillery capability of its own, with the added bonus that they could field any artillery piece anywhere almost instantly, but the most powerful supporting force available to them was the Air Rocket Artillery (ARA) battalion.

An early UH-1B (equipped with 70mm rockets) in an ARA configuration without door guns.
An early UH-1B (equipped with 70mm rockets) in an ARA configuration without door guns.

Any field commander in the division had the ability to call for a helicopter strike by the ARA, just as they would call an artillery strike, with the added benefit that the ARA’s supporting range was much greater than the coverage any artillery piece could provide. Fixed artillery doesn’t move once deployed, but the range of a helistrike is the range of the helicopter itself.

A U.S. Army Bell AH-1G Cobra, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry (Centaur) in Vietnam.
A U.S. Army Bell AH-1G Cobra, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry (Centaur) in Vietnam.

The versatility the division had was staggering and its mobility unparalleled, since it was not bound by any obstacles in the terrain. They could perform almost any mission and the troops always arrived to the combat zone rested and fresh, and could advance with the confidence that air and artillery support was just one step behind them. They also knew they would never be cut off from being resupplied.

Combat operations at Ia Drang Valley, Vietnam, November 1965. Major Bruce P. Crandall’s UH-1D helicopter climbs skyward after discharging a load of infantrymen on a search and destroy mission.
Combat operations at Ia Drang Valley, Vietnam, November 1965. Major Bruce P. Crandall’s UH-1D helicopter climbs skyward after discharging a load of infantrymen on a search and destroy mission.

Their missions included but were not limited to: search and rescue, search and destroy, combat air assault, fire support, medical evacuation (medivac), reconnaissance, resupply, artillery transport to and from front lines, shadowing the enemy, and so on.

Troops unload from a CH-47 helicopter in the Cay Giep Mountains, Vietnam, 1967.
Troops unload from a CH-47 helicopter in the Cay Giep Mountains, Vietnam, 1967.

The division used ladders and ropes to drop logistical teams where no landing zones existed. Engineers on the ground would open a clearing of level terrain and improvise a landing zone, while scout choppers kept them safe from enemy ambushes and the ARA was ready to provide covering fire if the enemy slipped past the scouts.

April 4, 1968. 1st Cav forces at LZ Stud, the staging area for Operation Pegasus.
April 4, 1968. 1st Cav forces at LZ Stud, the staging area for Operation Pegasus.

Contrary to popular belief, the Air Cavalry’s mobility was not impaired during bad weather or during the night. In Vietnam, bad weather was spotty and could be overcome by sufficient planning, even if it meant landing somewhat off target, and most choppers were fully equipped to operate during the night as well. But having a whole division so mobile that it could spread over hundreds of miles on any given day was not without challenges.

January 31, 1968. Start of Tet Offensive as seen from LZ Betty’s water tower, Quang Tri.
January 31, 1968. Start of Tet Offensive as seen from LZ Betty’s water tower, Quang Tri.

Communication was the key to efficiency, so unlike other divisions, the 1st Aircav had a special, more portable, and more potent version of the radio equipment every other unit had in their vehicles. Bell UH-1D Iroquois helicopters were outfitted with a variety of lightweight communication equipment in order to serve as mobile short range command and control liaison vehicles, and a CV2 Caribou was outfitted with long range communication equipment and used as a strategic command and control center.

CV2 or C7A Caribou taxiing at An Khe Airfield, April 13, 1967. Pilot in the right seat is an AF LTC getting checked out by ARMY WO1 IP – Photo by John Keller CC BY 2.0
CV2 or C7A Caribou taxiing at An Khe Airfield, April 13, 1967. Pilot in the right seat is an AF LTC getting checked out by ARMY WO1 IP – Photo by John Keller CC BY 2.0

The Caribou could also patch comms to allow conference calls among any and all commanding officers. This was devised so that every vehicle in the division could communicate at all times.

In case of jamming, or any other logistical impairments to communication, a Sikorsky CH-54 Tarhe “sky-crane” helicopter–a massive aircraft designed to lift equipment that could not be fitted inside a cargo plane–would transport a big metal container full of radio equipment that could be set up and used as a mobile headquarters near the field.

A CH-54A Tarhe carrying 2 UH-1 Hueys.
A CH-54A Tarhe carrying 2 UH-1 Hueys.

A typical Aircav mission structure would be as follows:

First, team of scout helicopters, such as the Bell H-13 Sioux, would scout and secure landing zones for artillery pieces around suspected hot zones. Then CH-47s would ferry the artillery pieces along with their crews and ammunition to those landing zones. Next, CH-47s carrying infantry would make drops near those hot zones.

Drops at the hot zones themselves would be handled by UH-1s, with gunships guarding them and laying down suppressive fire at the landing zone inside the hot zone. UH-1s were also tasked with carrying supplies to the troops and doing medivacs. Meanwhile, the ARA flight stood close by, ready to provide supporting fire during the whole operation.

A U.S. Army Bell UH-1D Huey helicopter prepares for a resupply mission December 1967.
A U.S. Army Bell UH-1D Huey helicopter prepares for a resupply mission December 1967.

Read another story from us: The ‘Huey’ – Legendary Workhorse of Vietnam War in 30 Pictures

The 1st Aircav would serve in the Vietnam War until the very end, thus causing the war to be nicknamed “The Helicopter War” and becoming the proof of concept that in modern wars, mobility would be paramount. However, this was achieved with much sacrifice because a great number of helicopters were shot down, reminding commanders that no unit is above getting ambushed.

wolfenlord

wolfenlord is one of the authors writing for WAR HISTORY ONLINE