As part of the strategic maneuvering during the Battle of the Bulge, Operation Bodenplatte was devised to incapacitate Allied airfields in the Low Countries. While Wehrmacht forces undertook a ground offensive in the Ardennes, the Luftwaffe was tasked with neutralizing as many Allied aircraft as possible. Unfortunately for the Germans, this operation, more commonly referred to as the “Hangover Raid,” ultimately inflicted a significant setback on what little remained of their own air forces.
Planning the Luftwaffe‘s last grandstand in the air
Following the successful Allied advances in Normandy following the D-Day landings in June 1944, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower skillfully exploited supply issues and inclement weather to push his forces deeper into the Germans’ fortified defensive line. The German Army, including the Luftwaffe, encountered various challenges, from fuel shortages to a lack of experienced pilots.
In an endeavor to reclaim aerial supremacy, Germany conceived a plan to strike Allied airfields and aircraft, with the aim being to impede their operations along the Western Front. On September 16, 1944, Generalleutnant Werner Kreipe, who served as head of the Luftwaffe‘s General Staff, was tasked with devising such an offensive.
The plan, formulated by General of Fighters Adolf Galland and approved by the Luftwaffe‘s commander-in-chief, outlined attacks on airfields in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, in support of the Ardennes Offensive. This strategy underwent refinement by Generalmajor Dietrich Peltz, who advocated for a single, coordinated strike to maximize effectiveness by preventing engagements between well-trained Allied pilots and their less-experienced German counterparts.
Several units were temporarily withdrawn from active duty on the Western Front to participate in what became known as Operation Bodenplatte. The primary aircraft employed were Messerschmitt Bf 109s and Focke-Wulf Fw 190s, with medium bomber and night-fighter units serving as pathfinders.
Initially slated to coincide with the commencement of the Battle of the Bulge, the aerial assault faced multiple postponements over the subsequent weeks due to adverse weather conditions. As the weather improved, the decision was made to launch the operation on New Year’s Day 1945, in support of Operation Nordwind.
Operation Bodenplatte
Rather than ushering in the new year with celebrations on the evening of December 31, 1944, the Luftwaffe pilots involved in Operation Bodenplatte were directed to retire early, while ground crews diligently prepared their aircraft. In the early hours of January 1, 1945, they took off from their bases, targeting 17 airfields: Ursel, Deurne, Woensdrecht, Asch, Evere, Volkel, Grimbergen, Sint-Truiden, Ghent, Metz, Melsbroek, Ophoven, Eindhoven, Heesch, Le Culot, Gilze en Rijen and Maldegem.
A subsequent examination of the plans revealed that several targets were mistakenly attacked.
Maintaining radio silence and guided by flares from Junkers Ju-88 and -188s, the plan was to execute the strike at dawn, at roughly 9:20 AM local time. The Germans capitalized on the element of surprise, catching the Allied airfields off guard as they were unprepared for an aerial assault; despite British Intelligence noting increased Luftwaffe movement and a buildup in the region, the imminent attack had gone unnoticed.
Upon reaching the airfields across the Low Countries, it became evident that numerous Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons were on missions or absent altogether. Grimbergen, for instance, greeted Jagdgeschwader 26 (JG.26) with an empty airfield, as the 132 Wing RAF had recently relocated to Woensdrecht. The remaining aircraft were defended by flak crews, resulting in more aircraft losses for the Luftwaffe than the Allies suffered on the ground.
Similarly, in Ghent, home to the No 131 (Polish) Wing, several Mk IX Supermarine Spitfire squadrons were away on an aerial bombing mission. Consequently, German pilots could only target buildings, trucks and a limited number of parked aircraft.
Among the heavily damaged airfields was Metz, where the American 365th Fighter Group’s fleet of Republic P-47 Thunderbolts faced strafing with machine gun and cannon fire, causing not only damage to aircraft, but also triggering explosions of fuel tanks and munitions.
Despite facing a resilient Allied defense, the Luftwaffe inflicted casualties, both in terms of human and aircraft losses. By around 12:00 PM that day, the German pilots gradually departed in ones and twos. An assessment of the inflicted damage revealed varying degrees of impact, with some targets suffering considerable damage while others escaped relatively unscathed.
The Allies suffered far less damage than the Germans
While the Luftwaffe claimed Operation Bodenplatte was a success, in terms of surprising the Allies, tactically, it crippled what remained of Germany’s weakening air forces. Of the 850 aircraft that had participated in the mission, 40 percent were destroyed or damaged. Of the pilots charged with manning them, 143 were killed or listed as missing in action (MIA), 70 had been taken as prisoners of war (POWs) and 21 had suffered various injuries. This amounted to the largest single-day loss for the Luftwaffe.
It’s reported that around half of the German aircraft downed during Operation Bodenplatte were taken out by friendly fire. When a post-mission analysis was conducted, it found that only a third of the air combat groups involved – 11 out of 34 – had launched their attacks on time and with surprise.
The Allies, on the other hand, were able to pick themselves up rather quickly after the air raids. Only 250 aircraft were destroyed, while 150 suffered damage that was subsequently repaired. Additionally, only a handful of pilots lost their lives. Within a week of Operation Bodenplatte, a number of aircraft were back in the air, destined for the Ardennes as part of the continuing Battle of the Bulge.
Why did Operation Bodenplatte go so wrong?
An analysis of Operation Bodenplatte showed that the mission was doomed from the start. The majority of the pilots assigned to the aircraft involved were inexperienced and had underwent far less training than those who’d flown earlier in the war. This inexperience was shown in the way the pilots conducted their attack, circling back over the airfields a number of times, meaning the Allies on the ground were given more opportunities to fire their anti-aircraft artillery at them.
The poor planning that went into Operation Bodenplatte also contributed to its failure. A number of the flight paths took pilots over heavily-guarded and -armed V2 launch sites, particularly around The Hague. The maps provided by the higher command were also half-complete. They featured only illustrations of the intended targets and left out details regarding the flight paths, to ensure the Allies wouldn’t be able to decipher anything, should the documents fall into their hands.
Secrecy also played a factor in the mission’s shortcomings. The majority of commanders were barred from providing advanced notice to pilots, meaning many were told what to do moments before taking off. Important details were omitted as a result, and many took to the air without a full understanding of what they were to do. As far as they understood, they were taking part in a reconnaissance mission.
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Finally, the Allies were not as hungover as the Luftwaffe had hoped they’d be following their New Year’s Eve celebrations. Many had toned down their partying the night before, as they were scheduled to conduct dawn missions the following day. Some were even on their way back of base when the Germans launched their attack, meaning they were able to provide additional support from the air, taking out a number of enemy aircraft.