On October 3, 2009, over 300 Taliban fighters launched a carefully coordinated assault on Combat Outpost (COP) Keating, a U.S. Army position in Kamdesh, Afghanistan. The outpost was defended by around 50 soldiers from Black Knight Troop (3-61 Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division), who were vastly outnumbered and faced overwhelming odds. Though they fought with extraordinary bravery, the battle came at a heavy price: eight soldiers were killed, and 22 others sustained injuries.
Kamdesh wasn’t a good location for a combat outpost
Combat Outpost (COP) Keating was established in 2006 in the Landai Sin Valley of Afghanistan’s Nuristan province. Many soldiers who arrived at the outpost viewed it as an impractical location, as the valley was surrounded by towering mountains, which left COP Keating vulnerable to attacks from above. The rough road nearby, used by Afghan forces, meant that resupply missions had to be conducted at night via helicopter.
Despite these drawbacks, the site for COP Keating was selected for its strategic proximity to the Pakistani border. The area was vital for anti-coalition forces that relied on supply routes through Pakistan, and the goal was to place allied troops in Kamdesh—where three valley systems met at the border—to disrupt the flow of weapons and fighters coming from across the border.
One of the base’s main objectives was to build relationships with local residents through development projects as part of a counterinsurgency strategy, but Taliban forces continued to move through the region. By 2009, three years after its establishment, COP Keating was deemed ineffective due to its weak defenses and limited strategic importance, and it was slated for closure in August 2009.
Since its inception, COP Keating had frequently been targeted by sniper and mortar attacks, but these incidents sharply increased in 2009, with 212 incidents reported in the first nine months alone. Adding to the difficulty, delays in its closure were caused by poor transportation and growing tensions between U.S. President Barack Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai. As a result, the Black Knight Troop found themselves in an increasingly precarious position, making disaster almost inevitable.
Battle of Kamdesh, minute by minute
At around 3:00 AM on October 3, 2009, 300 Taliban-backed insurgents arrived in Kamdesh and asked that locals evacuate. After they finished their morning prayers, they opened fire on COP Keating with Soviet-era B-10 recoilless rifles, DShK heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortar fire.
The insurgents had extensive knowledge of the base’s layout and weaponry, and they first targeted its most powerful weapon: the 120 mm mortar. As fighters descended upon COP Keating, others targeted nearby Observation Post Fritsche. At 6:03 AM, the post sent out an urgent message, “FRITSCHE AND KEATING IN HEAVY CONTACT.”
Within two minutes, the first US soldier was killed; Pfc. Kevin Thomson was shot in the face while defending the northernmost mortar pit. Not long after, Sgt. Josh Kirk was struck by RPG shrapnel while preparing to fire an AT4 anti-tank rocket. This was followed by a sniper’s bullet to the head.
The US troops tried to return fire from armored Humvees equipped with machine guns, but were overwhelmed as their ammunition ran low. Sgt. Vernon Martin was struck by a bullet and, shortly after, an RPG knocked a .50 caliber machine gun off its mount, spraying shrapnel and inflicting him with additional injuries.
Martin and another soldier were near a Humvee when they were joined by Sgt. Justin Gallegos and Spc. Stephen Mace. The four got into the vehicle as Spc. Ty Carter ran through a barrage of bullets with ammunition for the Humvee’s M240 machine gun, which was no longer operational. Without any way of fending off the ensuing Taliban forces, COP Keating was left even more vulnerable.
Spc. Michael Scusa was killed by a bullet to the neck while running from the barracks to defend another position. Hoping to cover the men trapped in the Humvee, Staff Sgt. Clinton Romesha began firing his M48 machine gun at the enemy, but was injured by the overwhelming gunfire.
Afghani guards fled as the fighting intensified
Forty-eight minutes into the Battle of Kamdesh, the Taliban had breached COP Keating’s perimeter defenses. Afghan National Army soldiers, tasked with guarding positions around the base, were encouraged to hold their ground but ultimately fled as the fight intensified. American soldiers reported that none of the Afghan troops remained; instead, they chose to run, hide, or seize equipment and supplies from the base during and after the assault.
The Taliban infiltrated the base and set its key buildings on fire. An hour into the battle, COP Keating’s defenders withdrew to protect two remaining buildings as more of the base fell to enemy control. With increasing numbers of Taliban fighters entering the area, the remaining U.S. troops realized they were at risk of being overrun. Lt. Andrew Bundermann ordered a contraction of the perimeter and a concentration of their firepower. However, Romesha delivered a final rallying cry, urging the men to “retake this ******* camp and drive the ******* Taliban out!”
The small group then organized two counterattacks. Sfc. Jonathan Hill agreed to lead his men to the east side, while Romesha gathered others to join him in pushing west to reclaim both the ammunition storage shed and the main entrance to the base. As the plan was set into motion, Boeing AH-64 Apaches arrived, striking Taliban positions along the mountainside.
A final attempt to take back control of Combat Outpost Keating
Romesha motivated his men with the words, “We’re taking this b***h back,” as they advanced toward the ammunition storage shed. They gathered grenades and directed their attack on the Shura building, a mosque occupied by Taliban fighters. Despite being heavily outnumbered by hundreds of insurgents, the eight soldiers successfully cleared the area, secured the dining hall, and fortified the entrance to COP Keating.
While American air strikes offered essential support, a new threat emerged as a burning tree endangered the aid station where wounded soldiers were sheltered. Acting swiftly, the remaining fighters used a chainsaw to bring down the tree before it could cause further harm. By 12:30 PM, most of the Taliban fighters had retreated, conceding defeat.
The 1-32 Infantry Quick Reaction Force (QRF) arrived to eliminate the remaining insurgents, resulting in 150 enemy fighters killed during the battle. By 7:00 PM, COP Keating was secured. Eight American soldiers lost their lives, and 22 were wounded.
In the days that followed, the remaining troops were evacuated, and the base was destroyed by a Rockwell B-1 Lancer.
Reliving what happened during the Battle of Kamdesh
In 2013, Romesha and Carter received the Medal of Honor for their courage, bravery and leadership during the Battle of Kamdesh. Additionally, 27 Purple Hearts, nine Silver Stars, 37 Army Commendation Medals with “V” and 21 Bronze Stars were presented to others who fought. The Silver Stars awarded to Bundermann and Gallegos (the latter posthumously) were upgraded to Distinguished Service Crosses.
In 2020, a film about the attack on COP Keating was released, based on Jake Tapper’s best-selling book, The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor. When one of the battle’s veterans caught wind that his experience would be made into a movie, he felt concerned about how the battle would be portrayed.
Writing in an article for The New York Times, retired Lt. Col. Stoney Portis explained, “Over the years, I have learned that sharing the experience allowed many of us to put our emotions into words. That process helped us heal, but a bad rendering of the battle would leave us talking about what the movie got wrong instead of what actually happened.”
Portis reached out to director Rob Lurie, who himself is a US Army veteran and graduate of US Military Academy West Point. He and fellow veteran, retired Maj. Chris Cordova, flew to Bulgaria to visit the film’s set. “When Cordova and I arrived on set, both of us were astounded. It looked just like our outpost on the day of the battle,” Portis wrote.
In his NYT piece, the veteran described walking into the replica aid station, where Cordova burst into tears. Nearly 10 years prior, his travel companion, a physician’s assistant at COP Keating, had worked for hours treating the wounded from the battle. One of those he’d cared for was 21-year-old Mace, whom Cordova kept alive for nine hours by giving him blood transfusions from other soldiers, including himself.
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Portis described how he and Cordova felt watching The Outpost be filmed, reliving the most traumatic day of their lives. In a bizarre twist, the combat veteran realized the powerful nature of watching his story – to be a listener, instead of the speaker. As he explained, listening is one of the biggest parts of the healing process, as by “allowing soldiers to tell their story, by hearing their story, you are also part of the healing.”
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